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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Does Utah Code Ann. 1953, §41-2-19.6 give the 
arresting officer authority to take appellant's driver's license 
in conjunction with an alleged city ordinance violation or only 
in conjunction with an alleged violation of Utah Code Ann. 1953, 
§41-6.44? 
2. May a penalty be imposed before conviction? 
3. May an arrest be made on mere suspicion and 
not probable cause? 
4. Is an arrest illegal if made on probable cause 
based on illegally obtained evidence? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This appeal stems from a drunk driving case wherein 
the appellant was charged with having violated a city ordinance. 
Yet, his driver's license was suspended for having violated a 
state statute. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
These proceedings now before this court involve only 
the matter of a per se hearing before the respondent and not the 
issue of the companion drunk driving case. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER TRIBUNALS 
The appellant was afforded an administrative per se 
hearing before Hearing Officer LaMar Smith of the office of the 
respondent under Utah Code Ann. 1953, §41-2-19.6 to determine if 
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the appellant's driver's license should be suspended on the 
ground that the arresting officer believed the appellant had 
been operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of 
alcohol in violation of Utah Code Ann. 1953, §41-6-44. 
The respondent suspended the appellant's driver's 
license for a period of 4 months effective June 2, 1985. 
That order was appealed and affirmed by the lower court. 
Both orders are now before this court on this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS FOR REVIEW 
At about 7:28 p.m. on the 2nd day of May, 1985 (T.8), 
the arresting officer received a call from his dispatcher that a 
citizen (appellant's wife) had reported that there was an intox-
icated person coming down 18th South in a silver Lincoln auto-
mobile (T.9). 
The arresting officer saw the appellant driving the 
somewhat described vehicle (color and make) traveling westbound 
on 1800 South at about 350 West in Bountiful, Utah (T.4). He 
observed nothing illegal which would have caused him to write a 
ticket (T.4 and T.10). Neither did his companion officer (T.13). 
The only reason he pulled him over was the dispatcher's 
call (T.10 and T.13). It was not until later, after he smelled 
the odor of alcohol and observed bloodshot eyes, that he had 
reason to believe the appellant was under the influence of alcohol. 
The arresting officer did not form his opinion that the 
appellant was driving while under the influence of alcohol until 
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after the field tests. 
The appellant was then arrested for "DUI .08", in 
violation of Bountiful City Code No. 8-4-501 (Citation No. 
024674), not Utah Code Ann. 1953, §41-6-44, as provided for 
under Utah Code Ann. 1953, §§41-2-19.6 and 41-2-20. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT OF THE CASE 
Utah Code Ann0 1953, §41-2-19.6 is unconstitutional 
because it imposes a criminal penalty before conviction. 
Even if constitutional, it should be strictly applied 
only as to a charge under Utah Code Ann. 1953, §41-6-44 and not 
a city ordinance. 
American Fork City v. Cosgrove, Utah, 701 P.2d 1069 
(1985), cannot be applied retroactively. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
RESPONDENT DENIED APPELLANT CONSTI-
TUTIONAL DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PRO-
TECTION OF LAW BY ITS ARBITRARY AND 
CAPRICIOUS ORDER OF SUSPENSION. 
Before the respondent can rely on Utah Code Ann. 1953, 
§41-2-19.6 as authority for its order of suspension, the arresting 
officer must have reasonable grounds to believe the appellant was 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. 1953, §41-6-44; and, therefore, at 
the time of arrest, take the appellant's driver's license and 
issue him a temporary license as the first step toward the admin-
istrative per se hearing and ultimate order of suspension. 
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The appellant was not even arrested for having violated 
Utah Code Ann. 1953, §41-6-44. The only applicable test for the 
officer having had reason to believe the appellant should be 
arrested for lfDUI .08" was whether or not he had violated 
Bountiful City Code No. 8-4-501. 
Utah Code Ann. 1953, §41-2-19.6 does not give the 
arresting officer authority to take the appellant's license in 
conjunction with an alleged city ordinance violation; instead, 
only in conjunction with an alleged violation of Utah Code Ann. 
1953, §41-6-44. 
Grants of powers to cities are strictly construed to 
the exclusion of implied powers not reasonably necessary in carry-
ing out the pruposes of the express powers granted. (Layton 
City v. Seth, Utah, 578 P.2d 828 (1978), citing Nasfell v. Ogden 
City, Utah, 249 P.2d 507, 508 (1952).) 
Without the express statutory authority to suspend a 
driver's license on the ground that the arresting officer had 
reason to believe the driver was in violation of a city ordinance, 
the respondent's order of suspension was unconstitutionally arbi-
trary and capricious, in violation of due process and equal pro-
tection of the law under United States Const., Amends, V and XIV; 
and Utah Const., Art. I, §7. 
POINT II 
UTAH CODE ANN. 1953, §41-2-19.6 IS 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL BY IMPOSING PENALTY 
BEFORE CONVICTION. 
.4. 
Assuming without admitting that Utah Code Ann. 1953, 
§41-6-19.6 is statutory authority for the reaspondentfs order of 
suspension, it is, nevertheless, unconstitutional in that it 
imposes the same driverfs license penalty as if convicted of 
drunk driving even before conviction. (See State v. Neely and 
State v. Belt, 19 Utah Adv. Rep. 15, filed September 26, 1985, 
citing United States v. Motlow, 10 F.2d 657, 662 (7th Cir. 1926), 
wherein it was held that "no one shall be required to suffer 
imprisonment for crime before determination of his case in the 
court of last resort.11) 
In the instant case, if the order of suspension were 
upheld, the appellant would have suffered for a crime (drunk 
driving) for which he had not yet been tried, nor finally convicted 
after app eal. In fact, he would have so suffered even if he had 
not even been charged with drunk driving. All Utah Code Ann. 
1953, §41-2-19.6 requires is only that the arresting officer has 
reason to believe the driver was driving while under the influence 
of alcohol. 
Such action would constitute a presumption of guilt 
rather than the constitutional right to the presumption of inno-
cence. (See Nasfell, supra.) 
POINT III 
APPELLANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO 
DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION OF 
LAW WERE DENIED BY ILLEGAL ARREST 
MADE ON MERE SUSPICION AND NOT 
PROBABLE CAUSE. 
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The arresting officer admitted the sole reason for stop-
ping the appellant was because of the dispatcher's call (T.10, 
T.13, and T.14), which was based on double hearsay evidence from 
a third person. 
This sole reason is evidenced by the hearing officer's 
verbatim question and the arresting officer's verbatim answer: 
Question (T.13 and T.14): 
Okay, I'm, I'm at a little, ah, I have, 
I, I've got in the back of my mind, 
I'm wondering, ah, why you stopped. 
Was it solely because of the dispatcher's 
call? Why you stopped this individual? 
Ah . .. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Answer (T.14): 
The, ah, to be on the lookout, we did 
watch for the person because of the 
color, yes. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Mere suspicion is not enough to constitute probable 
cause for arrest without a warrant. (Mallory v. U.S., 166 F.2d 
557 (6th Cir. 1948). 
Further, an investigative stop or detention predicated 
on mere curiosity, rumor, or hunch is also unlawful. Such arrest 
remains unlawful even though the officer was acting in complete 
good faith. (People v. McGaughran, 25 Cal.3rd 577, 159 Cal. 
Rptr. 191 (1979).) 
All the arresting officer had in the instant case was 
the hearsay rumor from the third person to the dispatcher to the 
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arresting officer. 
This does not meet the level of required probable cause 
for a lawful arrest. Nor does it meet the level of required 
probable cause for a lawful order of suspension. 
POINT IV 
APPELLANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO 
DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION OF 
LAW WERE DENIED BY ILLEGAL ARREST 
MADE ON PROBABLE CAUSE BASED ON 
ILLEGALLY OBTAINED EVIDENCE. 
The illegally obtained evidence is the results of the 
field sobriety tests, which were the alleged basis for the arrest, 
and the results of the intoxilyzer, which were considered by the 
hearing officer to determine the sole issue at the hearing, i.e., 
did the arresting officer have reason to believe the appellant 
had violated Utah Code Ann. 1953, §41-6-44, before he took his 
driver's license at the time of arrest. 
At the time of arrest (May 2, 1985), at the time of the 
taking of the appellantfs driver's license before the hearing 
(May 2, 1985), and at the time of the respondent's order of sus-
pension (June 2, 1985), Hansen v. Owens, Utah, 619 P.2d 315 
(1980), was the law of the State of Utah. There it was held that 
an accused could not be compelled to perform any affirmative acts 
which could be used as "evidence" against him. All would concede 
that field sobriety tests and breath tests would constitute 
affirmative acts. Therefore, the results of both would timely 
have been inadmissible in a criminal case of drunk driving against 
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the appellant. 
It is conceded that argument can be made that the 
Implied Consent Law, Utah Code Ann. 1953, §41-6-44.10, as it 
applies to refusal, has civil application only. However, Utah 
Code Ann. 1953, §41-2-19.6, the alleged authority for the order 
of suspension, referring to Utah Code Ann. 1953, §41-6-44, has 
criminal application as applied to drunk driving. 
In the instant case, the appellant submitted to the 
intoxilyzer test. Otherwise, he would have had his driver's 
license revoked for a year. So, the only ground for the respon-
dent's order of suspension was the issue of probable cause for 
drunk driving, a criminal charge. 
Therefore, the respondent cannot hide behind the facade 
of civil procedure when in fact criminal sanctions are imposed, 
the suspension of driver's license on probable cause, rather than 
on proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 
It is recognized that this court overruled Hans en, supra, 
by its decision in American Fork City v. Cosgrove, Utah, 701 P.2d 
1069 ( 1985). There it was decided there was no distinction between 
the self-incrimination clause of the federal constitution, which 
pertains only to testimonial evidence, and our state constitution 
which previously pertained to all types of evidence. 
Nevertheless, American Fork City! supra, was not, nor 
could not be, made retroactive. 
Consequently, the appellant had the constitutional right 
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not to be compelled to take the field sobriety tests or the 
intoxilyzer test. The arresting officer did not so advise him, 
so he could not intelligently, knowingly, and voluntarily waive 
those rights. 
CONCLUSION 
Any one, and especially all four, of the foregoing 
points, as related to the facts of the instant case, would dictate 
that the respondent^ order of suspension be reversed and the 
appellant^ driver's license reinstated. 
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT 
Oral argument is hereby requested under Category No. 13. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this <S^f day of June, 1986. 
PHIL L. HANSEN 
800 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 322-2467 
Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the «n- / day of June, 1986, 
I caused four (4) copies of Brief of Appellant to be served on 
the Office of the Utah Attorney General, 236 State Capitol Building, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114. 
±ii && ;*^^4^ 
PHIL L. HANSEN 
-9- Attorney for Appellant 
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In the District Court of the Second Judicial District 
IN AND FOR THE 
County of Davis, State of Utah 
BEN A. KIRSLING, ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. ' 
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, 
Defendant. 
1 RULING ON APPEAL 
1 Civil No. 37545 
This case came to this court as an appeal from the deci-
sion of the Drivers License Services hearing officer. Oral 
argument on the appeal was heard on October 22, 1985, with 
Phil L. Hansen appearing for Ben A. Kirsling and Bruce M. Hale 
appearing for Driver License Services. After oral argument, 
the court took the case under advisement to give Mr. Hale time 
to file a brief. The court now rules on the case. 
This case is an appeal from a hearing officer of Drivers 
License Services. The hearing officer found that Mr. Kirsling 
had violated U.C.A. 41-2-19.6 in that a police officer found 
that he was driving a motor vehicle while under the influence 
of alcohol. This court does not find the decision of the hear-
ing officer to be arbitrary or capricious and affirms the de-
cision of suspension of license. 
I will not restate the facts. They are sufficiently set 
out in the documents in the file and have been highlighted by 
counsel. 
Mr. Kirsling first argues that he was arrested for viola-
tion of the Bountiful City DUI law and that the suspension of 
license found in U.C.A. 41-2-19.6 applies only to arrests for 
DUI under U.C.A. 41-6-44. This court believes that U.C.A. 
41-6-43 and U.C.A. 41-6-16 authorizes cities to pass DUI laws 
not inconsistent with state law. This court assumes Bountiful 
City has done so, since that ordinance has not been challenged 
here. U.C.A. 41-2-19.6 then is appropriate for both state sta-
tute and city ordinance. 
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Second, Mr. Kirsling claims U.C.A. 41-2-19.6 is punitive 
in nature and imposes penalties before conviction of a crime. 
The Supreme Court has ruled many times that a drivers license 
is a privilege and not a right and that an action involving 
the suspension or revocation of that license is a civil pro-
ceeding and not a criminal prosecution. 
Third, Mr. Kirsling claims the arrest was made on mere 
suspicion and not probable cause. The facts do not bear this 
out. A citizen had complained. The police had a right and a-
duty to investigate. Part of the investigation involved stop-
ping the defendant's vehicle. The police were not required to 
ignore the citizen's complaint simply because they lacked suf-
ficient personal evidence. After stopping the defendant, police 
obtained sufficient evidence to justify the arrest. 
Lastly, Mr. Kirsling claims the intoxilyzer test was an 
infringement of his right against self-incrimination. First, 
Mr. Kirsling voluntarily took the test. Second, the Utah 
Supreme Court ruled in American Fork City vs. Crosgrove, filed 
June 4, 1985, that a breath test requirement does not violate 
either the federal or state constitutional privilege against 
self-incrimination. 
The action of the hearing officer is affirmed. The sus-
pension of Mr. Kirsling1s drivers license was appropriate. 
Mr. Hale is directed to draw a formal order in conformity 
to this decision. 
Dated November 7, 198 5. 
BY THE COURT: / 
JUDC 
Certificate of Mailing: 
This is to certify that the undersigned mailed a tri/e and 
correct copy of the foregoing Ruling to Phil L. Hansen, 800 
Boston Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 and Bruce M. Hale, 
Room 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 on November 
DAVID L. WILKINSON (#3472) 
At to rney General 
BRUCE M. HALE (#1298) 
A s s i s t a n t At torney General 
Room 23 6 S t a t e C a p i t o l 
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84114 
Telephone: 533-76 06 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
DAVIS LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BEN A. KIRSLING, 
P e t i t i o n e r , 
y s . 
FRED C. SCHWENDIMAN, Chief, 
Driver License Services, 
Department of Public Safety, 
State of Utah, 
Respondent. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER 
Case No. 37545 
Judge Douglas Cornaby 
The a b o v e - e n t i t l e d ma t t e r having come before the Court 
pursuan t t o Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-20 on October 22 , 1985, and t h e 
p a r t i e s be ing r e p r e s e n t e d by counse l , the Court makes the 
fo l lowing Findings and Conclus ions based upon t h e record and 
arguments . 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Court f inds tha t there i s evidence of substance 
in the record tha t shows t h a t the pe t i t i one r received an 
t 
f 
opportunity for a hearing, was not prejudiced, and the hearing 
examiner was not arbitrary or capricious. 
2. The practical and legal effect of the prior 
computerized printed order did not practically or legally effect 
or prejudice the rights of the petitioner. 
Having made the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court 
now makes its: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Court concludes thatr there being no prejudice 
or arbitrariness or capriciousness, the petition should be 
dismissed. 
2. The Court finds that U.C.A. § 41-6-43 and U.C.A. § 
41-6-16 authorizes cities to pass DUI laws not inconsistent with 
state law. This Court assumes Bountiful City has done so, since 
that ordinance has not been challenged here. U.C.A. § 41-2-19.6 
then is appropriate for both state statute and city ordinance. 
ORDER 
IT IS HEREBY ADJUDGED, ORDERED AND DECREED that the 
petition is dismissed. A -"^X^-*-*^^— 
DATED this day of fy p^ ^^ CJo-X-r*- , 1985. 
jJ po^L^- w^^^JL^ 
HONORABLE DOUGLAS CORNABY 
District Court Judge 
41-M9 Motor Vehicles 
revoke the license of any resident of this state upon 
receiving notice of the conviction of that person in 
another state of an offense committed there which, 
if committed in this state, would be grounds for the 
suspension or revocation of the license of an 
operator. The department is also authorized, upon 
receiving a record of the conviction in this state of a 
nonresident driver of a motor vehicle of any offense 
under the motor vehicle laws of this state to 
forward a certified copy of the record to the motor 
vehicle administrator in the state where the person 
convicted is a resident. 
(4)
 vThe department is authorized to suspend or 
revoke the license of any nonresident to operate a 
motor vehicle in this state for any cause for which 
the license of a resident operator may be suspended 
or revoked, and any nonresident who operates a 
motor vehicle upon a highway when his license has 
been suspended or revoked by the department is 
guilty of a misdemeanor. 
(5) The department may not suspend the license 
of any person for a period of more than one year, 
except as provided in Subsection (b) of Section 41-2-
18 and Section 41-12-17.5. The department may 
suspend the license of a person under Subsection 
(l)(g) until he shows satisfactory evidence of comp-, 
liance with the terms of the traffic citation. Upon 
suspending or revoking a license it shall require that 
all license certificates held by the person be surren-
dered to the department. At the end of the period 
of suspension the certificate surrendered shall be 
returned to the licensee. In the case of suspension 
under Subsection (l)(g) the licensee shall pay an 
additional fee of $25 to the department for the 
return of the license, as provided in Subsection 41-2-
8(7). 
(6) The department may immediately suspend the 
license of any person without hearing and without 
receiving a record of conviction of the person of 
crime whenever the department has reason to 
believe that the person's license was issued by the 
department through error or fraud or that the 
necessary consent for the license has been 
withdrawn or is terminated. The procedure upon 
suspension is the same as is provided by Subsection 
(2), except that after hearing the department shall 
either rescind its order of suspension or cancel the 
license. 
(7) The department, having good cause to believe 
that a licensed operator is incompetent or otherwise 
not qualified to be licensed, may upon written 
notice of at least five days to the licensee require 
him to submit to an examination. Upon the conclu-
sion of the examination trie department shall take 
action as may be appropriate and may suspend or 
revoke the license of the person or permit him to 
retain the license, or may issue a license subject to 
restriction as permitted under Section 41-2-9. 
Refusal or neglect of the licensee to submit to an 
examination is grounds for suspension or revocation 
of his license* 
(8) No report authorized by Section 41-2-12.1 
may contain any evidence of a conviction for 
speeding on an interstate system in this state if the 
conviction was for a speed of less than 71 miles per 
hour and did not result in an accident, unless auth-
orized in writing by the individual whose report is 
being requested. 
(9) The department may suspend the license of a 
person when the department has been notified by a 
court that the person has outstanding against him 
an unpaid fine or an uncompleted restitution requi-
UTAH COW > 
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VTAH CODE 
rement or an outstanding warrant levied by order of! 
a court, and the suspension shall remain in effw) 
until the department is notified by the court that the 
order has been satisfied. No report authorized b) 
Section 41-2-12.1 may contain any evidence of tht 
suspension. 
(10) This section applies to all fines, warrants,Of5 
restitution requirements as described in Subsecuot 
(9) which are outstanding on or after the effectm 
date of this act. 
(11) The department may immediately suspetf 
the license of a person if it has reason to bdie\» 
that the person is the owner of a motor vehicle fa 
which a security is required under Chapter 41, Tiu' 
31, and has operated the vehicle or permitted it u' 
be operated within this state without the secunn 
being in effect. The provisions of Sections 41-1.' 
17,5 and 41-12-29 regarding the surrender of liccfiK 
plates and registration of motor vehicles and (it; 
requirement of proof of financial responsibilitj [ 
apply to persons whose driving privileges m * 
suspended under this subsection. If the depanma* 
exercises the right of immediate suspension grants • 
under this subsection, the notice and hearing pro»
 t 
sions of Subsection (2) apply. A person whoa. 
license suspension has been sustained or who*' 
license has been revoked by the department und»{ 
this subsection may file a petition within 30 dip • 
after the sustaining of the suspension or the revoa{ 
tion for a hearing in the matter which, if held, ihal I 
be governed by the provisions of Section 41-2-20. \ 
41-2-19.5, Purpose of revocation or suspension for 
driving under the influence. 
The legislature finds and declares that a priram 
purpose of the provisions in this code that relate* 
suspension or revocation of a person's license or 
privilege to operate a motor vehicle for driving ww 
a blood alcohol content above a certain level a 
while under the influence of alcohol or any drug,* 
combination of alcohol and any drug, or fa 
refusing to take a chemical test provided for o 
section 41-6-44.10, is safely protecting persons« 
roads and highways by quickly removing from then 
roads and highways persons who have shown nV 
are safety hazards by driving with a blood alcoha 
content above a certain level or while under tfe 
influence of alcohol or any drug or combination e 
alcohol and any drug or by refusing to take t 
chemical test that complies with the requirements a 
section 41-6-44.10. , m 
41-2-19.6. Chemical test - Grounds and procedure 
for officer's request - Taking license - Report to 
department - Procedure by department - Suspensi-
on. 
(1) When a peace officer has reasonable ground 
to believe that a person may be violating or h 
violated section 41-6-44 the peace officer may, s 
connection with his arrest of the person, request fo 
person to submit to, a chemical test to be admin* 
ered in compliance with the standards set forth i 
section 41-6-44.10. j 
(2) The peace officer shall advise a person pnt] 
to the person's submission to a chemical test the J 
results indicating .08% or more by weight <r 
alcohol in the blood shall, and the existence of i 
blood alcohol content sufficient to render la 
person incapable of safely driving a vehicle cu 
result in suspension or revocation of the penes* 
license or privilege to operate a motor vehicle, 
(3) If the person submits to that chemical test« 
the results indicate a bl< 
or more, or if the offi 
based on reasonable grc 
termination is correct, t 
tn eolation of section 4 
administration of the tes 
tion shall serve on the p 
jurtment, immediate n< 
intention to suspend the 
to drive. If the officer sc 
vm behalf of the departs 
driver license or certificat 
driver, issue a temporary 
K) duys, and supply to tr 
approved by the depar 
regarding how to obtain 
the department. A citati 
m«iy, if approved as to 
Krve also as the temporary 
(4) The peace officer sei 
to the department within f 
urea and service of the n 
along with a copy of the 
she offense, and a swor 
chemical test results, if any 
the officer's determinatioi 
violated section 41-6-44, j 
regarding the person's viol* 
lach such report shall be < 
the department and shall be 
chief or his equivalent or by 
hiin, other than the officer sei 
(5) Upon written request 
been issued a 30-day licens 
f/ant to the person an op 
»<thin 30 days after the dat« 
*>f the 30-day license, but th 
*itmn 10 days of the date ol 
i?f the 30-day license. A he 
More the department in th 
«?cit occurred, unless the 
f«non agree that the hearin 
Nhcr county. The hearing st 
it scope shall cover the issu 
#• (fleer had reasonable grounc 
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©f* icction 41-6-44, whether 
t*brmt to the test, and the 
iDrmcction with a hearing • 
*vly authorized agent may 
«uy issue subpoenas for the 
And the production of relev. 
t*n« or more members of 
***iduct the hearing, and any 
faring before any number < 
apartment shall be as vali* 
Waring before the full memb 
mu After the hearing, the d 
carver that the person's licens 
Nf iuspended or that it not 
utpension, whether orderei 
•rukr this subsection, shall 1 
**>>• beginning on the 31st da 
**ie»t. A second or subsequ 
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'he results indicate a blood alcohol content of .08<fa 
flr more, or if the officer makes a determination, 
bsed on reasonable grounds to believe that the de-
termination is correct, that the person is otherwise 
a violation of section 41-6-44, the officer directing 
idministration of the test or making the determina-
tion shall serve on the person, on behalf of the de-
partment, immediate notice of the department's 
mention to suspend the person's privilege or license 
o drive. If the officer serves that immediate notice 
HI behalf of the department he shall take the Utah 
inver license or certificate or permit, if any, o f the 
inver, issue a temporary license effective for only 
'<0 days, and supply to the driver, on a form to be 
ipproved by the department, basic information 
tgarding how to obtain a prompt hearing before 
.he department. A citation issued by the officer 
ray, if approved as to form by the department, 
wvealso as the temporary license. 
(4) The peace officer serving the notice shall send 
o the department within five days after the date of 
urest and service of the notice the person's license 
dong with a copy of the citation issued regarding 
Jie offense, and a sworn report indicating the 
.hemical test results, if any, and any other basis for 
it officer's determination that the person has 
Tiolated section 41-6-44, and the officer's belief 
yarding the person's violation of section 41-6-44. 
C«h such report shall be on a form approved by 
J»e department and shall be endorsed by the police 
Aief or his equivalent or by a person authorized by 
inn, other than the officer serving the notice. 
(5) Upon written request of a person who has 
Vcn issued a 30-day license, the department shall 
{rant to the person an opportunity to be heard 
•ithin 30 days after the date of arrest and issuance 
sf the 30-day license, but the request must be made 
»nhin 10 days of the date of the arrest and issuance 
:f the 30-day license. A hearing, if held, shall be 
More the department in the county in which the 
irrest occurred, unless the department and the 
xrson agree that the hearing may be held in some 
tfher county. The hearing shall be documented and 
«scope shall cover the issues of whether a peace 
officer had reasonable grounds to believe the person 
o have been operating a motor vehicle in violation 
jf section 41-6-44, whether the person refused to 
wbmit to the test, and the test results, if any. In 
connection with a hearing the department or its 
ijiy authorized agent may administer oaths and 
•ay issue subpoenas for the attendance of witnesses 
nd the production of relevant books and papers. 
Jne or more members of the department may 
onduct the hearing, and any decision made after a 
earing before any number of the members of the 
Apartment shall be as valid as if made after a 
karing before the full membership of the departm-
fflt. After the hearing, the department shall order, 
nther that the person's license or privilege to drive 
* suspended or that it not be suspended. A first 
uspension, whether ordered or not challenged 
nder this subsection, shall be for a period of 90 
lays, beginning on the 31st day after the date of the 
trrest. A second or subsequent suspension under 
lis subsection shall be for a period of 120 days, 
^ginning on the 31st day after the date of arrest. 
the department shall assess against a person, in 
iddition to any fee imposed under subsection 41-2* 
ft7), a fee of $25, which must be paid before the 
arson's driving privilege is reinstated, to cover 
iJministrative costs, and which fee shall be canceled 
J the person obtains an unappealed department-
hearing or court decision that the suspension was 
not proper. A person whose license has been 
suspended by the department under this subsection 
may file a petition within 30 days after the suspens-
ion for a hearing in the matter which, if held, shall 
be governed by the provisions of section 41-2-20. 
1*3 
41-2-20. Judicial review of license cancellation, 
revocation or suspension - Scope of review. 
Any person denied a license or whose license has 
been canceled, suspended or revoked by the depart-
ment except where such cancellation or revocation is 
mandatory under the provisions of this act unless 
the suspension occurred pursuant to section 41-2-
19.6 shall have the right to file a petition within 
thirty days thereafter for a hearing in the matter in 
a court of record in the county wherein such person 
shall reside and such court is hereby vested with ju-
risdiction and it shall be its duty to set the matter 
for hearing upon ten days' written notice to the 
department. The court's jurisdiction is limited to a 
review of the record to determine whether or not 
the department's decision was arbitrary or capricio-
us, m i 
41-2-21. New license after revocation. 
(1) Any person whose license has been revoked 
under this act shall not be entitled to apply for or 
receive any new license until the expiration of one 
year from the date such former license was revoked 
or longer as provided in sections 41-2-18 and 41-2-
19. Licenses which have been revoked may not be 
renewed, but application for a new license must be 
filed as provided in'section 41-2-8, and a license so 
issued shall be subject to all of the provisions of an 
original license. The department shall not grant the 
license until an investigation of the character, 
abilities and habits of the driver has been made to 
indicate whether it will be safe to again grant him 
the privilege of using the highways. 
(2) Any resident or nonresident whose operator's 
license to operate a motor vehicle in this state has 
been suspended or revoked as provided in this act 
shall not operate a motor vehicle in this state under 
a license, permit, or registration certificate issued by 
any other jurisdiction or otherwise during such sus-
pension or after such revocation until a new license 
is obtained when and as permitted under this act. iw 
41-2-22. Owner liable for negligence of minor. 
Every owner of a motor vehicle causing or 
knowingly permitting a minor under the age of 
eighteen years to drive such vehicle upon a highway, 
and any person who gives or furnishes a motor 
vehicle to such minor, shall be jointly and severally 
liable with such minor for any damages caused 6y 
the negligence of such minor in driving such vehicle. 
1953 
41-2-23. Violation of license provisions. 
It shall be unlawful for any person to commit any 
of the following acts: 
(1) To display or cause or permit to be displayed 
or to have in possession any operator's license 
knowing the same to be fictitious or to have been 
canceled, revoked, suspended or altered; 
(2) To lend to , or knowingly permit the use of, 
by one not entitled thereto, any operator's license 
issued to the person so lending or permitting the use 
thereof; 
(3) To display or to represent as one's own any 
operator's license not issued to the person so displ-
aying the same; . 
(4) To fail or refuse to surrender to the departm 
T)DE«CO 
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41-6-43.10 Motor 
or property shall be consistent with the provisions 
o f this code which govern those matters. 1W3 
41-6-43.10. Negligent homicide - Death occurring 
within one year - Penalty - Revocat ion of license or 
privilege to drive. 
(1) When the death of any person ensues within 
one year as a proximate result of injury received by 
the driving of any vehicle in reckless disregard of 
the safety of others, the person so operating such 
vehicle shall be guilty of negligent homicide. 
(2) Any person convicted of negligent homicide 
shall be punished by imprisonment in the county 
jail for not more than -one year or by fine of not 
less than $100 nor more than $1,000, or by both 
such fine and imprisonment. 
(3) The department shall revoke the license or 
permit to drive and any nonresident operating 
privilege of any person convicted of negligent 
homicide. i«3 
41-6-44. Driving under the influence of alcohol or 
drug or with high blood alcohol content • Criminal 
punishment - Arrest without warrant - Suspension 
or revocation of license. 
(1) It is unlawful and punishable as provided in 
this section for any person with a blood alcohol 
content of .08% or greater by weight, or who is 
under the influence of alcohol or any drug or the 
combined influence of alcohol and any drug to a 
degree which renders the person incapable of safely 
driving a vehicle, to drive or be in actual physical 
control of a vehicle within this state. The fact that a 
person charged with violating this section is or has 
been legally entitled to use alcohol or a drug does 
not constitute a defense against any charge of 
violating this section. 
(2) Percent by weight of alcohol in the blood 
shall be based upon grams of alcohol per one 
hundred cubic centimeters of blood. 
(3)(a) Every person who is convicted the first time 
of a violation of Subsection (1) shall be punished by 
imprisonment for not less than 60 days tior more 
than six months, or by a fine of $299, or' by both 
the fine and imprisonment. But if the person has 
inflicted a bodily injury ' upon another as a 
proximate result of having operated the vehicle in a 
negligent manner, he shall be punished by impriso-
nment in the county jail for not more than one 
year, and, in the discretion of the court, by a fine 
of not more than $ 1,000. 
(b) For the purposes of this section, the 
standard of negligence is that of simple negligence, 
the failure to exercise that degree of care which an 
ordinarily reasonable and prudent person exercises 
under like or similar circumstances. 
(4) In addition to the penalties provided for in 
Subsection (3), the court shall, upon a first convict-
ion, impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less 
than 48 consecutive hours nor more than ten days, 
with emphasis on serving in the drunk tank of the 
jail, or require the person to work in a community-
service work program for not less than two nor 
more than ten days and, in addition to the jail 
sentence or the work in the community-service work 
program, order the person to participate in an asse-
ssment and educational series at a licensed alcohol 
rehabilitation facility. 
(5)(a) Upon a second conviction within five years 
after a first conviction under this section or under a 
local ordinance similar to this section adopted in 
compliance with Subsection 41-6-43(1), the court 
shall, in addition to the penalties provided for in 
Subsection (3), impose a mandatory jail sentence tf 
not less than 48 consecutive hours nor more thu 
ten days, with emphasis on serving in the druu 
tank of the jail, or require the person to wod is i 
community-service work program for not less tu. 
ten nor more than 30 days and, in addition to IU 
jail sentence or the work in the community-sen a 
work program, order the person to participate in u 
assessment and educational series at a IICCJIK*' 
alcohol rehabilitation facility. The court may, in a 
discretion, order the person to obtain treatment k 
an alcohol rehabilitation facility. 
(b) Upon a subsequent conviction within fnt 
years after a second conviction under this section <t 
under a local ordinance similar to this secfu 
adopted in compliance with Subsection 41-6-4tyt 
the court shall, in addition to the penalties prov.itf 
for in Subsection (3), impose a mandatory ,u 
sentence of not less than 30 nor more than 90&** 
with emphasis on serving in the drunk tank of h 
jail, or require the person to work in a commune 
service work project for not less than 30 nor nvi 
than 90 days and, in addition to the jail sentence a 
work in the community-service work pro&rwv 
order the person to obtain treatment at an alcota 
rehabilitation facility. 
• (c) No portion of any sentence imposed wvto 
Subsection (3) may be suspended and the convict** 
person is not eligible for parole or probation uf* 
any sentence imposed under this section has bm 
served. Probation or parole resulting from a COD* 
ction. for a violation of this section or a lea 
ordinance similar to this section adopted in comp^  
ance with Subsection 41-6-43(1) may not be ttm 
nated and the department may not reinstate in 
license suspended or revoked as a result of the co* 
viction, if it is a second or subsequent convict** 
within five years, until the convicted person U 
furnished evidence satisfactory to the depanmcti 
that all fines and fees, including fees for restitute 
and rehabilitation costs, assessed against the p*rv& 
have been paid. 
(6)(a) The provisions in Subsections (4) and $ 
that require a sentencing court to order a convtcut 
person to participate in an assessment and eduo* 
onal series at a licensed alcohol rehabiliuuir 
facility, obtain, in the discretion of the cevi 
treatment at an alcohol rehabilitation facility, a 
obtain, mandatorily, treatment at an alcohol rehtf 
ilitation facility, or do any combination of tW 
things, apply to a conviction for a violation a 
Section 41-6-45 that qualifies as a prior of feu 
under Subsection (7), so as to require the court u 
render the same order regarding education ,T 
treatment at an alcohol rehabilitation facility, a 
both, in connection with a first, second, or subtq 
uent conviction under Section 41-6-45 that qualify 
as a prior offense under Subsection (7), as he *o*t 
render in connection with applying respectively, i*t 
first, second, or subsequent conviction requircmcaj 
of Subsections 41-6-44(4) and (5). 
(b) For purposes of determining whether i & 
nviction under Section 41-6-45 which qualified IU 
prior conviction under Subsection (7), is a Ut 
second, or subsequent conviction under this sub« 
tion, a previous conviction under either Section <. 
6-44 or 41-6-45 is deemed a prior conviction. A^  
alcohol rehabilitation program and any commune 
based or other education program provided for it 
this section shall be approved by the Department 4 
Social Services, 
(7)(a) When the prosecution agrees to a plea ft 
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: guilty or no contest to a charge of a violation of 
I Section 41-6-45 or of an ordinance enacted 
pursuant to Subsection 4i-6-43(b) in satisfaction 
| of, or as a substitute for, an original charge of a 
| violation of this section, the prosecution shall state 
I for the record a factual basis for the plea, including 
| whether or not there had been consumption of 
| alcohol or drugs, or a combination of both, by the 
i defendant in connection with the offense. The 
| statement shall be an offer of proof of the facts 
• which shows whether or not there was consumption 
; of alcohol or drugs, or a combination of both; by 
! the defendant, in connection with the offense. 
! (b) The court shall advise the defendant before 
i accepting the plea offered under this subsection of 
| the consequences of a violation of Section 41-6-45 
i as follows: If the court accepts the defendant's plea 
! of guilty or no contest to a charge of violating 
I Section 41-6-45, and the prosecutor states for the 
| record that there was consumption of alcohol or 
! drugs, or a combination of both, by the defendant 
j in connection with the offense, the resulting convic-
! tion is a prior offense for the purposes of Subsect-
ion (5). 
j (c) The court shall notify the department of 
! each conviction of Section 41-6-45 which is a prior 
! offense for the purposes of Subsection (5). 
(8) A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest 
! a person for a violation of this section when the 
officer has probable cause to believe the violation 
has occurred, although not in his presence, and if 
the officer has probable cause to believe that the j 
violation was committed by the person. j 
(9) The Department of Public Safety shall 
I suspend for 90 days the operator's license of any | 
person convicted for the first time under Subsection ,i 
(I), and shall revoke for one year the license of any 
person otherwise convicted under this section, | 
except that the department may subtract from any i 
i suspension period the number of days for which a j 
I license was previously suspended under Section 41-2-
19.6 if the previous suspension was based on the I 
same occurrence upon which the record of convict-
i ionisbased. . in$ 
41-6-44.2. Repealed. u u ' 
41-6-44.3. Standards for chemical breath analysis -
Evidence. 
(1) The commissioner of public safety shall 
establish standards for the administration and inte- j 
rpretation of chemical analysis of a person's breath j 
including standards of training. 
(2) In any action or proceeding in which it is 
material to prove that a person was driving or in j 
actual physical control of a vehicle while under the 
influence of alcohol or driving with a blood alcohol 
content statutorily prohibited, documents offered as 
memoranda or records of acts, conditions or events 
to prove that the analysis was made and the instru-
ment used was accurate, according to standards est-
ablished in subsection (1) shall be admissible if: 
(a) The judge finds that they were made in the 
regular course of the investigation at or about the 
time of the act, condition or event; and 
(b) The source of information from which 
made and the method and circumstances of their 
preparation were such as to indicate their trustwor-
thiness. 
(3) If the judge finds that the standards establis-
hed under subsection (1) and the conditions of sub-
section (2) have been met, there is a presumption 
that the test results are valid and further foundation 
fikuwh For ANNOTATIONS, consult the 
for introduction of the evidence is unnecessary. i9» 
41-6-44.5. Admissibility of chemical test results in 
actions for driving under the influence or with a 
prohibited blood alcohol content - Weight. 
(1) In any action or proceeding in which it is 
material to prove that.a person was driving or in 
actual physical control of a vehicle while under the 
influence of alcohol or with a blood alcohol content 
statutorily prohibited, the results of a chemical test 
or tests as authorized in section 41-6-44.10 shall be 
admissible as evidence. 
(2) if the chemical test was taken within two 
hours of the alleged driving or actual physical 
control, the blood* alcohol level of the person at the 
time of the alleged driving or actual physical control 
shall be presumed to be not less than the level of 
the alcohol determined to be in the blood by the 
chemical test. 
(3) If the chemical test was taken more than two 
hours after the alleged driving or actual physical 
control, the test result shall be admissible as 
evidence of the person's blood alcohol level at the 
time of the alleged driving or actual physical 
control, but the trier of fact shall determine what 
weight shall be given to the result of the test. 
(4) The foregoing provisions of this section shall 
not prevent a court from receiving otherwise admis-
sible evidence as to-a defendant's blood alcohol 
level at the time of the alleged driving or actual 
physical control. i«3 
41-6-44.8. Municipal attorneys authorized to 
prosecute for driving while license suspended or 
revoked. 
Alleged violations of section 41-2-28, which 
consist of the person driving while his operator's or 
chauffeur's license is suspended or revoked for a 
violation of section 41-6-44, a local ordinance 
which complies with the requirements of section 41-
6-43, section 41-6-44.10, section 76-5-207, or a 
criminal prohibition that the person was charged 
with violating as a result of a plea bargain after 
having been originally charged with violating one or 
more of those sections or ordinances, may be pros-
ecuted by attorneys of cities and towns as well as by 
prosecutors who are empowered elsewhere in this 
code to prosecute those alleged violations. i9tt 
41-6-44.10. Implied consent to chemical tests for 
alcohol or drug - Refusal to allow - Warning, 
report, revocation of license - Court action on rev-
ocation - Person incapable of refusal - Results of 
test available • Who may give test • Evidence. 
(1) Any person operating a motor vehicle in this 
state shall be deemed to have given his consent to a 
chemical test or tests of his breath, blood, or urine 
for the purpose of determining whether he was 
driving or in actual physical control of a motor, 
vehicle while having a blood alcohol content statut-
orily prohibited, or while under the influence of 
alcohol, any drug, or combination of alcohol and 
any drug as detailed in section 41-6-44, so long as 
the test is or tests are administered at the direction 
of a peace officer having grounds, to believe that 
person to have been driving or in actual physical 
control of a motor vehicle while having a blood 
alcohol content statutorily prohibited, or while 
under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or combi-
nation of alcohol and any drug as detailed in 
section 41-6-44. A peace officer shall determine 
which of the aforesaid tests shall be administered, 
No person who has been requested under this 
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